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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DANIEL K. RIGGS, : Case No. 970012-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE 
FLIGHT INSTRUCTION. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 11-22) 
A. THE STATE CONCEDES THAT FLIGHT CANNOT 
SHOW CONSCIOUS OF GUILT FOR A CRIME THAT 
HAS NOT YET BEEN COMMITTED. 
At trial on the automobile homicide charges, the trial 
court gave the jury instruction 23, which provided: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a crime or after that 
person is accused of a crime that has been committed, is 
not sufficient in itself to establish the defendant's 
guilt. However, such flight, if proved, may be 
considered by you in light of all other proven facts in 
the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred 
from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt 
of the crime charged, and there may be reasons for flight 
fully consistent with innocence. Therefore, whether or 
not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and 
the significance, if any, to be attached to any such 
evidence are matters exclusively within the province of 
the jury. 
R. 768 (addendum B). 
The State concedes that this instruction is illogical 
where the crime charged occurs after the flight: 
Because the only flight in this case occurred before the 
homicides, it would not be rational to assume that 
defendant fled because he felt guilty about killing 
someone. 
2 
State's brief at 18-19. Yet instruction 23 did precisely that: it 
permitted the jury to infer guilt of automobile homicide from the 
fact that Mr. Riggs was fleeing prior to the fatal accident. The 
instruction was not rational or logical, and should not have been 
given. 
B. THE STATE IMPROPERLY TREATS THE FLIGHT 
INSTRUCTION AS THOUGH IT WERE LIMITED TO 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTOXICATION. 
The State argues at length that a flight instruction was 
proper as Mr. Riggs' flight showed a consciousness of intoxication. 
While perhaps true, Mr. Riggs is not here challenging a theoretical 
consciousness of intoxication instruction that the State failed to 
request and the trial court failed to give. At issue here is the 
consciousness of guilt instruction, given at trial as instruction 
23. 
The law expressly recognizes the concept of limited 
admissibility: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one 
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another 
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon 
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope 
and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Utah R. Evid. 105. Here, the evidence of flight may have been 
admissible for the purpose of showing consciousness of 
intoxication.1 However, it was incumbent on the court to properly 
xMr. Riggs still asserts that under the specific facts of this 
case, involving a stolen truck, presence of a loaded weapon, and an 
earlier burglary, it is unlikely that the flight was the result of 
a consciousness of intoxication, rather than an attempt to avoid 
detection and prosecution on one or more of the other more serious 
offenses. 
3 
limit the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly. This did not occur. 
Contrary to settled precedent, the State indulges a 
presumption that the jury refused to follow and apply the plain 
language of the flight instruction: 
Because the only flight in this case occurred before the 
homicides, it would not be rational to assume that 
defendant fled because he felt guilty about killing 
someone. Thus, it would be highly improbable that any of 
the jurors would make such an inference. 
State's brief at 18-19. 
In addition, the jury would not have inferred that 
defendant fled because he felt guilty over the homicides 
because the accident had not yet happened. 
State's brief at 23 n.lO(cont.). These statements highlight the 
problem with instruction 23 -- it instructed the jury that they 
could infer such guilt. 
Settled precedent requires that we assume the jury 
followed the erroneous flight instruction: 
We generally presume that a jury will follow the 
instructions given it. State v. Burk, 839 P. 2d 880, 
883-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Hodges, 30 
Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974)), cert, denied, 
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 
U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995). We must assume 
that the jury followed the erroneous instruction. 
C. EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT 
SO OVERWHELMING THAT GIVING THE FLIGHT 
INSTRUCTION WAS HARMLESS BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
4 
The State argues that any error in giving instruction 23 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Not so. Failure to submit 
material elements of an offense to the jury is structural error: 
The provision of our State Constitution which grants 
accused persons the right to a trial by jury extends to 
each and all of the facts which must be found to be 
present to constitute the crime charged, and such right 
may not be invaded by the presiding judge indicating to 
the jury that any of such facts are established by the 
evidence. The constitutional provision may not be 
disregarded under the pretext that there is no conflict 
in the evidence or that the evidence will permit of but 
one finding. When an accused enters a plea of not 
guilty, he has a right to have his entire case submitted 
to the jury unless he waives such right by expressly 
admitting at the trial the existence of some fact or 
facts which is or are put in issue by the plea of not 
guilty. These principles of law are so fundamental in 
our system of criminal procedure that we deem it 
unnecessary to cite cases and authorities in support 
thereof. 
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1931). 
The practical effect of the flight instruction was to 
remove the element of negligence versus criminal negligence from 
the consideration by the jury. The flight instruction permitted an 
inference of guilt, a knowing mental state that subsumes both 
negligence and criminal negligence. 
"Failure to give an elements instruction for a crime 
satisfies the manifest injustice standard under [Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 19(c)] and constitutes 
reversible error as a matter of law." Id. "Further, 
because ' "[t]he general rule is that an accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential," ' failure to provide such an instruction is 
reversible error that can never be considered harmless." 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998) . The flight 
instruction here resulted in an error just as egregious. 
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This error is not harmless under any standard. Given the 
lateness of the hour, approximately 3:30 A.M., and the very light 
traffic at the time, it is not inconceivable that a reasonable 
person would find simple negligence rather than criminal 
negligence. Indeed, the pursuing officer deemed conditions 
sufficiently safe to engage in a high speed pursuit. This Court 
should reverse. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUPPRESS MR. RIGGS' STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY 
STRATFORD. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point II, pp. 23-
36) 
A. MR. RIGGS' STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY STRATFORD 
WERE NOT MERELY CUMULATIVE OF ADMISSIBLE 
STATEMENTS MADE TO ANOTHER OFFICER. 
The State asserts that Mr. Riggs' prior statement to 
Deputy Hunter that he had been "driving a stolen '94 Ford Ranger," 
R. 495-6, 1151-2, is the functional equivalent of his statement to 
Deputy Stratford that "he knew the car was stolen before the 
officer had turned his lights on and they decided to run from him, " 
R. 497, 1125. Untrue. 
The first statement reveals nothing more than that at the 
time he made the statement to Deputy Hunter, he had become aware 
that the truck was stolen. It does not indicate that he knew the 
truck was stolen at the time he was driving it.2 The second 
2Mr. Riggs could have obtained this information from numerous 
possible sources. He could have been informed by an officer; by a 
news broadcast via radio or television; or by a family member or 
hospital staffer who had seen or heard such a broadcast. 
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statement reveals that same knowledge as of the time the statement 
was made to Deputy Stratford, but additionally conveys that he was 
aware at the time he was driving that the vehicle was stolen. 
Mr. Riggs' admission that he was aware at the time he was 
driving that the vehicle was stolen would have been extremely 
damaging to his case at trial, virtually guaranteeing a conviction. 
His statement to Deputy Hunter is easily explained, and would not 
have had the same effect. Similarly, his statement to Deputy 
Roesler that "I did it; I'm guilty as hell," R. 500, 1140, says 
nothing about his knowledge at the time he was driving. These 
other admissible statements simply would not have the same 
devastating impact as his admission that he was aware that the 
vehicle was stolen at the time he fled from police. 
B. HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS OF EVIDENTIARY 
QUESTIONS IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE 
CONDITIONAL PLEA CONTEXT. 
The State mis-reads State v. Lindcrren, 910 P. 2d 1268 
(Utah App. 1996), and reaches the erroneous conclusion that 
harmless error analysis is possible in the conditional plea 
context. In Lindgren, this Court noted: 
The determination of whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome is 
based upon a review of the record. State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) . This review requires the 
appellate court to determine from the record what 
evidence would have been before the jury absent the trial 
court's error. Knight, 734 P. 2d at 920. In the instant 
case, however, the record does not provide the court 
assistance in discovering the true nature or magnitude of 
the prejudice to defendant. Rather, following the trial 
court's ruling on the State's motion in limine, defendant 
did not proceed to trial, but entered a conditional 
guilty plea. Because defendant entered a Sery plea, 
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there is insufficient evidence in the record upon which 
this court can determine whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would not have convicted 
defendant." Id. at 921. 
This court must therefore presume that absent 
the trial court's error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of an outcome more favorable to defendant. 
Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1274. 
Lindgren contemplates review of actual trial proceedings, 
taking into account any changes that would have been present as a 
result of the evidentiary error being assessed. Lindgren does not 
sanction unguided speculation as to what might have been presented 
at a trial that has not occurred. Harmless error analysis is not 
possible in the conditional plea context, where there is never a 
record of the trial evidence. The State's assumption that the 
evidence at Mr. Riggs' stolen car trial would be identical to that 
presented at his trial for auto homicide is untenable. 
The State cites State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Utah 
App. 1993) in support of its contention that harmless error 
analysis is possible. White involved review of a search warrant. 
This Court held that the nighttime execution authorization approved 
by the magistrate was improper, but "harmless" because the warrant 
was executed during daylight hours. Though couched in terms of a 
harmless error analysis, in essence the ruling is based on 
justiciability concerns of mootness and standing. 
Here, such concerns are not present. The issue presented 
only concerns the admissibility of Mr. Riggs' statements to Deputy 
Stratford, and it cannot seriously be contended that Mr. Riggs 
lacks standing to assert such a claim. 
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Viewed in an alternative fashion, the harm here is not 
what was admitted at trial on the stolen car charge, for no trial 
has yet occurred. The harm here is that Mr. Riggs pled 
conditionally guilty premised on the trial courts erroneous ruling. 
This conviction, and the 1 to 15 year prison sentence imposed on 
it, cannot be said to be harmless. 
This Court is reviewing the trial court's determination 
of the admissibility of evidence. Just as it would have been 
improper for the trial court to rule that the evidence was 
inadmissible, but would be admitted anyway because admission would 
be harmless error, so here it would be improper for this court to 
attempt to apply a wholly speculative harmless error analysis. 
C. THE STATEMENTS WERE THE RESULT OF 
INTERROGATION AS DEFINED IN INNIS. 
The State asserts that the question asked of Mr. Riggs 
was not interrogation because it only called for a yes or no 
answer. This hypertechnical reasoning does not comport with 
reality. Deputy Stratford himself testified that he was seeking 
Mr. Riggs' side of the story. It is undisputed that Mr. Riggs was 
injured and medicated. Under all the circumstances, asking Mr. 
Riggs if he remembered the crime was not only reasonably likely, 
but very likely to result in an incriminating response. And the 
proof is in the pudding. Mr. Riggs incriminated himself. Asking 
a suspect if he remembers the crime is entirely unlike the routine 
booking questions concerning name, address, age, height, weight, 
education, employment, personal goals, and medications with which 
the State would have the question compared. 
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Mr. Riggs' statements were responsive to the question. 
He was asked if he remembered what happened, and he responded by 
relating what he remembered happening. This result should not 
surprise anybody. The statements should have been suppressed; this 
Court should reverse. 
• * * 
Mr. Riggs relies on his opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not expressly responded to 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Riggs respectfully requests 
that his convictions be reversed. The automobile homicide 
convictions should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
due to the improper flight instruction, and Mr. Riggs should be 
permitted to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty to the 
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle charge. The trial 
court's order denying suppression of statements made to Deputy 
Stratford should be reversed, and Mr. Riggs should be permitted to 
withdraw his conditional guilty plea to receiving or transferring 
a stolen vehicle. 
10 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L-b day of July, 1999. Uh 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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